

# OFFICIAL DISPATCH *28*

VIA: **AIR**  
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. **MOX-W-6311**  
**MICROFILMED**

**SECRET**

CLASSIFICATION

**MAR 28 1962**

DOC. MICRO. SER.  
21 September 1960

TO: Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

DATE:

FROM: Chief, Foreign Division M

Attn:

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational

SPECIFIC: **DUDA, Anthony - MACIEJEWSKI, Stanislaw**

REFERENCE: **WOLA 2594, WASH Cable**

1. Our cable of 7 September (number unknown at present) informed you of the fact that **Franciszek KUSZAL** is now in this country and has been debriefed by the domestic office. The interrogation took place prior to the receipt of reference and this office was not aware of KUSZAL's presence in the United States until traces were initiated on the persons named in your memorandum.

2. As we mentioned, it all came about as a result of contact having been established with **ADAMCZYK (KERN 4892)** who was eager to introduce KUSZAL to representatives of this organization in order to establish direct liaison between U.S. intelligence and Polish-Russian anti-Soviet activities.

3. Attached as enclosure A are the results of the first debriefing of KUSZAL exactly as received. You will note that KUSZAL's account contains some details not given in Annex 2, **WOLA 2594** and vice versa. Much is, of course, at variance with the **ZIPPER** account but this may be due to the fact that KUSZAL probably relied on his memory for all details.

4. Enclosure B contains questions prepared by FDS and the answer supplied by KUSZAL. We shall prepare another brief and attempt to learn full details of KUSZAL's connections with **SAMOTYJA** and **ZIMARYCZUK**.

5. A competent interrogation of DUDA would have settled the doubts in this case and we certainly hope that you will be able to obtain the complete results of his debriefing. Some of the **ZIPPER** staff have suggested that they be permitted to interrogate deserters and defectors in U.S. custody in order to obtain operational leads and yet they seem to be incapable of conducting complete and thorough interrogations.

6. If, in the final analysis, it is determined that DUDA's story is reliable and that he has not been doubled, it would be highly desirable that he be thoroughly trained and briefed and again attempt a more successful contact with the partisans. Note KUSZAL's claim (para. 8, encl. A) that these partisans have ten radio sets in their possession.

FDS ☐  
COORDINATING OFFICER

Richard Helms  
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-25  
JUN 1960

(7A)

## NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

### EXEMPTIONS, Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy ☐  
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒  
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

Declassified and Approved for Release  
by the Central Intelligence Agency  
Date: *2005*

7. In the meantime there appears to be no reason to inform ZIPPER that we are in contact with KUSZAL. Thus far they haven't informed us that he emigrated. KUSZAL's absence from the scene raises the question of DUDA's willingness to cooperate with his case officer, whoever that may be, since he was unwilling to tell all except to KUSZAL, whom we presume was the "White Russian expert of CV 0". It may be advisable to set up postal intercepts on both SAMUTZ and ZWARTZBURG, and if possible on DUDA himself. His usefulness may be jeopardized if he continues to write letters such as the one to KUSZAL saying U.S. authorities had suggested that he return to Byelorussia. Furthermore, we can probably expect ABRAMOWITZ to attempt contact with DUDA or SAMUTZ in order to learn details of ZIPPER's contemplated dispatch of DUDA. KUSZAL undoubtedly keeps ABRAMOWITZ completely informed and the latter returns to Europe on 5 October. According to MCKY 4892, ABRAMOWITZ himself is considered discreet and reliable but his organization is known to have been penetrated by Soviet and satellite agents.

Donald W. Baugh

Enclosures. two

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Enclosure A - Liaison Mission to Byelorussian Partisans

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1. Through the medium of Nicola Abramchik, OO was put in touch with Colonel (General) Franciszek Kushal (Kushal); a Byelorussian of 55 years of age who during World War II has been living in Munich, Germany.

2. During his residence in Munich, Kushal was in contact with Captain Soltis (Zoltis) of CIC, Regensburg, through two Ukrainian intermediaries by the names of Samultin and Major Zvoritchuk.

3. In May 1948, Kushal dispatched two young Byelorussian patriots to their homeland to establish contact with local partisan groups and to bring back a member of the partisan organization. This mission was initiated with the knowledge of CIC to establish continued liaison between the partisans and Kushal.

4. The two following men were dispatched:

A. (Pnu) Monitch (Monic), who used the cover names of Matsievski and Doda for the purposes of his mission. Monitch was born in Lubcha (Lubec) near Novo Grodek in Byelorussia. He is about 27 years of age. He was educated in a DP gymnasium for Byelorussians at Michelsdorf near Regensburg.

A. (Pnu) Kananovitch, who used the cover name of Yankowski for purposes of his mission. He is about 27 and was born and raised near Baranovice.

5. Monitch and Kananovitch did not know each other. After accepting the undertaking of this mission, both left as Polish repatriates and were sent first of all to the Repatriation Camp at Lauf, near Euerberg. Limited financial aid was extended to them by Kushal.

Nothing was heard from Kananovitch until March 1950, at which time Kushal received a letter from him, postmarked Gdansk (Danzig). In this letter Kananovitch stated that he was returning "home". Inasmuch as Kananovitch has not returned to Munich, Kushal assumes he has gone to Byelorussia for continuance of his mission.

7. Monitch returned to Western Germany in December 1949 and gave an account of his trip to Kushal, of which the following is a resume:

Monitch was taken from Lauf to a Polish repatriation camp at Csiedsice (phonetic). At this camp he was screened by the Polish Secret Police. During this screening he was photographed and fingerprinted, and afterwards released with a certificate giving him legal status as a repatriate. In this camp and previously, Monitch declared he had been born in Bialystok and was going there to look for his mother.

Monitch spent only a few days in Bialystok as he was afraid that local police authorities would demand that he register.

Upon leaving Bialystok, he went to Siemiatice (phonetic) near the Byelorussian (USSR) border and at this place he presented himself to an Orthodox priest. (How Monitch contacted this priest was not recalled by Kushal.) The date at this time was August 1948. After a few days, the priest turned Monitch over to a peasant named Kananchuk who, although not a partisan, had contact with the partisans. Kananchuk took Monitch to his house and that night brought in an active partisan.

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Monitch and the partisan left Kananchuk's house under cover of darkness and crossed the Polish-Soviet frontier. It took the two men about two hours to cross the frontier using the most difficult terrain as their path. About 10 kilometers east of the frontier, Monitch was blindfolded by his companion and led to an underground shack in a deep forest. At this shack, Monitch was interrogated for a lengthy period of time. He said he had been sent by Kushal to meet General Vitoushka, nominal military leader of the Byelorussian partisans. He was forced to tell all he knew about Kushal and his wife to establish his bona fides. The man who was interrogating Monitch would ask a question, leave, and then return, giving the impression that he was in radio contact with Vitoushka (or had the GI's).

After the conversation was over, Monitch was blindfolded, led out of the forest and taken back across the border to Kananchuk's house, where he was told to wait for further developments.

While staying with Kananchuk, Monitch got a job on the railroad and went via rail to Nowogrodek as a stowaway. The route followed was the railroad from Bialystok to Baranovice, thence north to Nowojelnia and on to Nowogrodek. He went from Nowogrodek to Lubcha (Lubca), his birthplace. At Lubcha he was led by old neighbors of his to the partisan group of Haliboki in the forest of Nieleboscakaya Pustcha.

The chief of the partisans of this area went under the name of Kalanka; however, Monitch was met by a Dr. Bardenovic, who had been a medical officer under Kushal. He also met a Major Dub, who was an ex-officer under Kushal and gained the complete confidence of both these men. At various times Monitch was promised a meeting with Vitoushka, but this never materialized.

Upon his departure from this group, Monitch was told that he was to be accompanied back to Germany by a trusted partisan company commander named Major Kalka. In all, Monitch had spent about five to six months on USSR territory.

The two men made the trip to Poland on foot, bypassing all main roads and communication points. After reaching Polish territory, they took a train and got as far as the newly-acquired western Polish territory. At a railroad station, Kalka was arrested by the Polish police, apparently after having been recognized by former members of the Armia Krajowa who had been transferred to the Polish police. There is no further record of Kalka. Monitch escaped and at this point destroyed a letter and a photograph which the partisans had entrusted to him for delivery to Kushal.

Shortly after Kalka's arrest and in another town Monitch, himself, was arrested as a vagrant and given a six months' prison term. After serving his sentence, he was sent to work at a kolkhoz near the Polish-German border. The head of this kolkhoz was a notorious black marketer who enlisted the services of Monitch as his sales agents. Through the medium of this kolkhoz chief, Monitch was able to cross the Polish-German border and get to the US sector of Berlin in December 1944.

Monitch reported to CIG in Berlin, ... refugee camp. He was taken out of this camp by a US Colonel named Schtchorbin (Cherbin?) and upon his insistence to see Kushal, Zvoritchuk came to see him. Later Zvoritchuk and US authorities took Monitch to Munich, where he still resides.

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Monitch provided Kushal with satisfactory evidence that he had been in Poland, in a Polish prison and working in a kolkhoz. He also was able to pick out and name several people that Kushal knew were definitely members of Partisan groups in Byelorussia from photographs in Kushal's possession. Kushal is 100% satisfied that Monitch met the partisans and stayed with them.

8. Based upon Monitch's account, Kushal has concluded that the Byelorussian partisans under Vitushka's command are split into the following main geographic groups:

- A. The Vitebsk group, with the strongest concentration near Lepel, is under the direct personal command of General Vitushka.
- B. The Polesian Marsh group north of Pinsk is led by one Sakha (a pseudonym; a former 1st Lt. ~~Natskevich~~, personally known to Kushal, was recognized by Monitch and may, in fact, be identical with "Sakha").
- C. The Maliboki group north of M-70 Grodek is under the command of one Malanka. Presumably, the Polesian Marsh and Maliboki groups are in touch with Vitushka through radio communications.

Each of the three partisan groups mentioned above has two main elements: The SVB (Special Information Service) is the intelligence arm of the partisan groups. The Chornai Kot (Black Cat) is the action unit charged with paramilitary tasks, including sabotage.

Monitch passed on to Kushal the partisans' message, according to which they are well supplied with German and Soviet weapons and even have sufficient ammunition for the foreseeable future. Their main shortages occur in the field of medical supplies, and there is no hope of obtaining enough even for their most urgent needs, as the Soviets themselves are desperately short of medical supplies, at least in the BSSR. (Bandages may be purchased for as high as 500 rubles each.)

The partisans have ten radio sets in their possession. Monitch has no details on this important matter and apparently failed to inquire further.

9. In 1948, the partisans planned a major scheme in the area of Baranovitsa. They attacked the airport near Baranovitsa in an attempt to steal several planes with which to send emissaries to Western Europe. The Soviets were prepared for this attack and inflicted serious losses upon the partisans; Vitushka was wounded in the arm. Although the partisans had enlisted the cooperation of several Soviet officers for their scheme, it was betrayed to faithful Soviet authorities, apparently by members of the former Armiya Krajova. (When Poland had to cede territory east of the Curzon Line to the USSR, about 2,500 members of the AK under Lupashko elected to remain on USSR territory and to subordinate themselves to Byelorussian partisan command; some security problems have arisen to the partisans from that because of the collaboration of other former AK personnel in Poland with the new regime.)

Since the debacle at Baranovitsa, the Byelorussian partisans have attempted to tighten their security and to reorganize in smaller cells. No major military actions have been undertaken since that time, and the partisans have been preoccupied with the training of cadres.

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10. Kushal believes that the partisan movement in Byelorussia has a considerable potential both for immediate intelligence purposes and for military purposes in case of an East-West conflict because Byelorussia lies astride the main supply route for Soviet troops in the West. He is convinced that contact with them would be of great importance for the US. He suggests that Monitch and additional personnel should be carefully briefed and dispatched to the BSSR. One of the short-range purposes of such a mission would be the establishment of radio communication with the partisans, for which they are naturally eager and perhaps even prepared. In furtherance of long-range plans, he proposes to enlist up to one hundred young Byelorussian patriots from among the groups supporting Abramtchik to be sent to the BSSR in time of war as cadres both for intelligence and paramilitary purposes. For any such plans, close liaison between Abramtchik and himself and the proper US authorities is a prerequisite as the operation should be completely under US direction; training in modern partisan warfare, in intelligence methods, etc. would have to be extended to personnel charged with these tasks. The continental US affords the only logical security protection for such a program, in Kushal's opinion. (We believe that this view is subject to correction.)

11. The above information is based upon a fairly extensive interrogation, during which spontaneous observations on the part of Kushal were augmented through repeated questioning. On the mission of Monitch, in particular, certain details are not now available to Kushal and would presumably have to be obtained indirectly. Kushal, however, will be available for additional interrogation.

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Enclosure 3

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1. On what basis were Monitch and Kananovich selected for the mission of contacting the partisan groups in Byelorussia? How did their availability for such a mission come to Kushal's attention?

A. Col. Kushal originated the idea of sending Monitch and Kananovich to Byelorussia. He directly recruited Monitch while Kananovich was recruited by Lt. Staroshelski, an aid of Col. Kushal's. Kushal received financial aid from Samulin and assumes that Samulin received some of his funds from the US authorities. Both men were chosen for their youth, courage and patriotism, as well as for the fact that neither of them appeared to be either intellectuals or military types.

2. Why did Monitch contact the priest in Siemiatice? What led him to believe that the priest could help him? How had he happened to hear about him? Had he been given pre-mission instructions to contact him?

A. Col. Kushal has no details of method of contact with the priest in Siemiatice. He assumes that contact was made through Kananovich and states that fuller details on this question are contained in Enclosure C. (Retained for translation)

3. When Monitch was guided across the border, blindfolded, by the partisan, could he detect any evidence of the fact that he was actually crossing the border?

A. Monitch's eyes were not blindfolded while crossing the Polish-Byelorussian frontier. He left Poland by night and arrived in Byelorussia, and consequently assumes that in so doing he must have crossed the frontier.

4. Did Monitch stow away on the train under the direction of the Partisans? Where did he hide on the trip to Novogrodek? How did he enter the train? Where did he leave it? What type of train was he riding (freight or passenger)? Was the train searched on crossing the border?

A. Kananovich put Monitch in a freight car. Monitch left the freight car shortly prior to his arrival in Novogrodek. Further details on this are also contained in Enclosure C. Kushal states that he does not believe that frontier traffic controls are very stringent between satellite states and Soviet territory inasmuch as the Soviets control all traffic in both anyway.

5. How did Monitch establish his bona fides with the Partisans in the USSR? Had he been given directions on this before leaving the home of Kananovich? Had the Partisans been notified of his intended arrival? Had Monitch been active in partisan activities before leaving the USSR?

A. Monitch established his bona fides with the partisans only after extensive interrogation by the partisans. Kananovich had given him no instructions and, as a matter of fact, Monitch did not know that Kananovich was contacting the partisans until the guide was brought to him. This was the case mainly because Kananovich himself did not want to give Monitch any information that could be useful to secret police. The partisans had been notified of Monitch's arrival by Kananovich but through no other channels. Monitch had never before been associated with the partisan movement.

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6. Where and how did Monitch live while in the Soviet Union? What documents did he obtain or carry? What would have been his story if he had been arrested? Where and how did the Partisans obtain supplies?

A. While in the Soviet Union, Monitch lived with the partisans. He carried no Soviet documents. If arrested, he was to say that he was returning to his home town as he had been officially repatriated in Poland and merely wanted to get home. The partisans received supplies from local peasants who were sympathetic with their cause. Arms and munitions consist of those captured during the war.

7. By what means did Monitch and Major Kalke cross the border into Poland on their return from the USSR? At what point did they cross the border? What border installations did they encounter?

A. Monitch and Kalke crossed the border into Poland on foot via forests and marshes along the border. They evaded all villages and traveled at night. Enclosure A contains information as to the exact spot at which the border was crossed.

8. Did Monitch reach any agreement with the Partisans as to a possible repetition of his mission by himself or by others?

A. Monitch spoke of returning to the Partisans while with them. He was told that if he or another should return, they must first stop at Kanachuk's. Monitch was furthermore supplied with a password to be used by any men that Kshah might send back to the partisans.

9. Did Monitch bring with him any verbal messages from the Partisans?

A. Monitch brought back no other messages than those that have already been reported.

10. How can Monitch be reached in Munich?

A. Col. Kshah can contact Monitch in Munich. He would be very glad to get a letter of introduction to Monitch upon request. It is felt that such a letter would be necessary if full cooperation were to be expected from Monitch.

Three days ago, Kshah received a letter from Monitch in Munich, stating that the US Government, presumably through Samultin, had suggested that he return to Byelorussia. He was asked to collect military information only. Kshah has no other details.

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